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NOTES
contributions to an organization formed solely to support or oppose a state
ballot question."' Another portion of the opinion withdrew earlier contradic-
ting opinions.
The recent opinion leaves unanswered, as earlier opinions have done, the
question of the status of organizations that were not "formed solely to sup-
port or oppose a state ballot question." Suppose an organization was formed
for the purpose of expressing views on a particular subject long before there
was a possibility of a ballot question on that subject. If a ballot question
on the issue does arise, would the members be required to form a new organiza-
tion, whose purpose is "solely to support or oppose a state ballot question"
before they consider themselves free from contribution limitation? Such a result
is inconsistent with recent first amendment interpretations, yet it would occur
if the Attorney General's opinion were strictly followed.
Regardless of the potential for confusion discussed above, the Attorney
General's opinion provides further support for the theme of this note: that
certain provisions of the Oklahoma Campaign Contributions and Expenditures
Act are markedly unconstitutional. It is hoped that Oklahoma's legislature will
soon take action to reestablish the vital consideration which every democracy
owes freedom of speech.
John W. Raley III
Criminal Law: Oregon v. Kennedy. Avoiding the Double
Jeopardy Bar
The setting is a criminal prosecution. The state has rested, and counsel for
the accused is wrapping up the defense by calling the accused as a witness.
Believing that the state's case is weak and an acquittal is likely, the prosecutor
decides to abort the trial and risk another. Intending to provoke the accused
to move for a mistrial, on cross-examination the prosecutor questions the de-
fendant about his post-arrest silence, contrary to the holding in Doyle v. Ohio.'
The trial court then grants a mistrial at the request of the defendant.
In a similar situation, another prosecutor is reasonably satisfied with the
strength of his case but decides that some extra leverage might be helpful.
Not intending to provoke a mistrial, the prosecutor nevertheless attempts to
direct prejudice at the defendant by questioning a witness concerning prior
unprosecuted crimes allegedly committed by the defendant. Again, a mistrial
is granted at the defendant's request.
In both cases, the defendant's right to a fair trial has been prejudiced by
the conduct of the prosecutor. In the first case, the prosecutor has evinced
125. Id.
1. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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a specific intent to provoke a mistrial motion; in the second case, the motion
has been provoked by bad faith conduct, or overreaching, even though the
prosecutor did not intend that this would be the case. In deciding whether
to move for a mistrial in either situation, the defendant is faced with a "Hob-
son's choice": He may move for a mistrial and face a second prosecution
on the same charge, or he might opt to continue the tainted proceeding, with
a high likelihood that it will end in a conviction. In such a situation the op-
tion is an illusory one because few defendants would want to proceed when
a conviction is the inevitable result. The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment o the Con-
stitution guarantees the defendant at least a meaningful choice.2 Where the
conduct of the prosecutor denies the defendant a meaningful choice, the Court
has held that a reprosecution would be barred after a successful motion for
a mistrial by the defendant.
3
In Oregon v. Kennedy," the Supreme Court severely restricted the right of
an accused to invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clauses after he
has successfully moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor has
acted in a manner prejudicial to the defendant. The Court held that in order
for the reprosecution of the defendant to be barred by the double jeopardy
clause, it would be necessary to show that the prosecutor had deliberately
provoked the defendant to make the mistrial motion.6 Under Kennedy, a de-
fendant may not invoke the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution where a
mistrial is granted because of mere overreaching or the prejudicial conduct
of the prosecutor,7 but must show that there was a specific intent on the part
of the prosecutor to provoke the mistrial motion. Thus the Kennedy decision
would bar reprosecution only in the first case mentioned above. Prior to Ken-
nedy, however, a defendant could have invoked the bar in either of the cases.
This note will explore the ramifications of the decision in Kennedy. It will
begin with an examination of the historical development of the overreaching
standard adopted in pre-Kennedy cases and follow with a brief discussion
of those cases, illustrating an intent to depart from that standard in Kennedy.
The new subjective intent standard, established in Kennedy, will become evi-
dent in an examination of the opinions in the decision. Differing views of
the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause will be discussed in
an attempt to determine what result, if any, is demanded by a particular view
of the clause. Specific criticisms of the Kennedy decision will be offered. Final-
2. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976).
3. Id.
4. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
5. The general rule is that a defendant's motion for mistrial removes any bar to reprosecu-
tion. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 610 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,
485 (1971). But there is an exception to the rule that obtains when prosecutorial or judicial miscon-
duct provokes the motion for mistrial. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 610; Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485.
6. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 669 (1982).
7. The Court had previously established the overreaching or bad faith conduct standard
as a bar to reprosecution in Jorn and Dinitz.
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ly, the effect of the Kennedy decision on the application of the double jeopardy
bar in lower courts will be discussed.
The Overreaching Standard
The previous standard for determining when a reprosecution is barred after
a mistrial is granted at the defendant's request was set out in the Supreme
Court cases of United States v. Jorn8 and United States v. Dinitz.9 In Jorn,
the Court recognized the general rule that a bar to reprosecution is removed
when a defendant moves for a mistrial, but noted an exception: "Thus, where
circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching,
a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any
barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by
prosecutorial or judicial error."' 0
The opinion addressed the issue of the exception more directly in a foot-
note to the case: "Conversely, where a defendant's mistrial motion is
necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an ac-
quittal, reprosecution might well be barred."" In dicta the Court also noted
that permitting reprosecution after an aborted trial "does not compel the con-
clusion that double jeopardy policies are confined to the prevention of pros-
ecutorial or judicial overreaching."'2 This language compels the conclusion
that prevention of conduct amounting to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching
is a legitimate aim of the double jeopardy clause. The Jorn Court reasoned
that overreaching that motivates the defendant to move for a mistrial would
bar reprosecution and afford the defendant the protection intended by the
double jeopardy clause.'"
In United States v. Dinitz, " Justice Stewart clearly expressed the view of
the Court that the prosecutor's conduct was controlling on the issue of whether
reprosecution would be permitted. Reflecting on the purposes of the double
jeopardy clause, he noted: "It bars retrials where 'bad faith conduct by a
judge or prosecutor threatens the harassment of an accused by successive pro-
secutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict' the defendant."" Although a defendant
might freely elect to surrender "his option to go to the first jury and, perhaps,
end the dispute then and there with an acquittal,"'6 Justice Stewart reasoned
that such an election induced by the conduct of the prosecutor might be the
product of a meaningless choice:
8. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
9. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
10. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971).
11. Id. at n.12. The Court cited the previous case of United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
468 n.11 (1964), for that proposition.
12. 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971).
13. Id.
14. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
15. Id. at 611.
16. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971).
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It is evident that when judicial or prosecutorial error seriously prej-
udices a defendant, he may have little interest in completing the
trial and obtaining a verdict from the first jury. The defendant
may reasonably conclude that a continuation of the tainted pro-
ceeding would result in a conviction followed by a lengthy appeal
and, if reversal is secured, by a second prosecution. In such cir-
cumstances, a defendant's mistrial request has objectives not unlike
the interest served by the Double Jeopardy Clause-the avoidance
of the anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple pros-
ecutions. I 7
Thus, where bad faith conduct or conduct amounting to overreaching induced
the mistrial motion:
[Tihe defendant generally does face a Hobson's choice between
giving up his first jury and continuing a trial tainted by prejudicial
judicial or prosecutorial error. The important consideration, for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant re-
tain primary control over the course to be followed in the event
of such error."8
Thus, the Court in Dinitz held the standard to be one of bad faith conduct
or overreaching on the part of the prosecutor.
The bad faith conduct language in Dinitz was an explicit definition of the
overreaching standard announced in Jorn, rather than an expansion of that
standard. Under the overreaching standard, the conduct of a prosecutor or
a judge determined whether reprosecution was barred by the double jeopardy
clause. Although the specific intent to provoke a mistrial motion would pro-
hibit reprosecution, the protection of the double jeopardy clause was not
limited to that situation; objectionable conduct on the part of the prosecutor
might raise the bar absent a specific intent.'9
In Lee v. United States,2" Justice Powell further defined the sort of con-
duct that might bar reprosecution under the double jeopardy clause: "It follows
under Dinitz that there was no double jeopardy barrier to petitioner's retrial
unless the judicial or prosecutorial error that prompted the petitioner's mo-
tion was 'intended to provoke' the motion or was otherwise 'motivated by
bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice' petitioner." 21 The holding
in Lee suggested that there was a two-pronged test for determining whether
reprosecution is barred after a successful mistrial motion by the defendant.
One prong of the test involved conduct specifically intended to induce the
mistrial motion by the defendant. However, conduct not intended to induce
17. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608 (1976).
18. Id. at 610.
19. The focus of Kennedy is solely on the intent of the prosecutor, not on the conduct itself.
20. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
21. Id. at 33-34. Justice Powell's opinion in Lee is important in that his concurrence com-




the motion might also bar reprosecution if done in bad faith or in an attempt
to harass or prejudice a defendant. This second prong of the test focused
on the conduct itself, rather than the intent, and possibly included gross
negligence on the part of the prosecutor, who reasonably should have known
that his conduct would induce a mistrial motion.2 2 Although Lee specifically
rejected the notion that mere negligence on the part of the prosecutor would
bar a retrial, the question of whether gross negligence would prevent reprosecu-
tion under the overreaching standard was left open.
Departure From the Overreaching Standard
The standard established by Jorn, Dinitz, and Lee did not long escape at-
tack by the more conservative members of the Court. In Divans v. California,3
Justice Rehnquist denied an application for stay of sentence. The petitioner
had been reprosecuted and convicted after successfully moving for a mistrial
based on prejudicial remarks made by the prosecutor at trial." Justice Rehn-
quist interpreted the standard set out in Jorn and Dinitz as requiring a specific
intent on the part of the prosecutor to provoke a motion for mistrial by the
defendant. Absent that specific intent, reprosecution was not barred by the
double jeopardy clause. The opinion, which ignored the language in Lee, held:
"It must be shown that not only was there error, which is the common
predicate to all such orders, but that such error was committed by the pros-
ecution or by the court for the purpose of forcing the defendant to move
for mistrial.""' The Divans opinion was important in that it demonstrated
the intent to erode the overreaching standard into a specific intent standard.
However, the opinion did not modify or overrule Jorn, Dinitz, or Lee because
it was merely a memorandum opinion and, as such, not controlling authority.
In United States v. DiFrancesco,"6 Justice Blackmun cited Dinitz for the
proposition that the intent of the prosecutor alone was controlling on the
issue of reprosecution: "Furthermore, reprosecution of a defendant who has
successfully moved for a mistrial is not barred, so long as the Government
did not deliberately seek to provoke the mistrial request."2 7 The language
in DiFrancesco is dicta, but it is important in that it was cited in Kennedy
as precedent for the specific intent standard."8 Although better authority for
the standard than the memorandum opinion in Divans, it is nevertheless ques-
tionable that it was controlling on the issue in Kennedy because the DiFrancesco
language was not a holding. In any event, the distortion of the overreaching
22. Certain jurisdictions have determined that gross negligence on the part of the prosecutor
which prejudices the defendant bars retrial. See cases cited infra at note 72.




26. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
27. Id. at 130. Justice Blackmun's opinion in DiFrancesco is interesting in that he concurred
with the minority in Kennedy.
28. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982).
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standard in DiFrancesco and Divans demonstrated the dissension among the
Justices concerning the scope of the exception and laid the groundwork for
the decision in Kennedy.
29
The restrictive interpretation of the overreaching standard suggested in
Divans and DiFrancesco was adopted by the Court in Kennedy. The defend-
ant in the case was tried for the theft of a rug. During his initial trial, an
expert witness was called to testify as to the value of the rug. In an attempt
to establish bias on the part of the witness, defense counsel elicited an admis-
sion from the witness that he had previously filed a criminal complaint against
the defendant but had failed to pursue that complaint. The prosecutor at-
tempted to rehabilitate the witness by repeatedly asking the reason why the
complaint was filed. Objections to each attempt were sustained, and the
frustrated prosecutor finally asked the witness if he had done business with
the defendant. When the witness replied that he had not, the prosecutor then
asked, "Is that because he is a crook?"' 30 At the defendant's request, the trial
court granted a mistrial but permitted retrial because the court found that
the prosecutor had not specifically intended to provoke the motion for mistrial.
The defendant was retried and convicted, but the Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the prosecutor's conduct was overreaching and that
reprosecution was barred by the double jeopardy clause.3 1 The contrary
holdings of the trial court and the appellate court reflected the inherent con-
flict between the restrictive approach taken in Divans and DiFrancesco and
the approach taken in Jorn, Dinitz, and Lee.
The Kennedy Opinions
The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Kennedy, as written by Justice Rehnquist, sharply
distinguished between prosecutorial misconduct that would justify a mistrial
and conduct that would bar reprosecution after declaration of a mistrial.
3
1
Justice Rehnquist criticized the reprosecution exception as lacking clear and
concise standards for application and specifically rejected the notion that prej-
udice to the defendant should prevent a retrial. He noted that a prosecutor
must inevitably inject prejudice into the trial proceedings as a legitimate func-
tion of the prosecution. Justice Rehnquist concluded that every act would
thus be objectionable, and a standard of prosecutorial overreaching incor-
porating conduct of the prosecutor that "seriously prejudiced a defendant"'
29. It is interesting to note that the standard under Dinitz and Jorn was not officially limited
until Kennedy. Justice Stewart, the author of the Dinitz opinion, obviously considered bad faith
conduct or harassment hat resulted in a mistrial motion as sufficient to bar reprosecution. This
portion of the exception was not abandoned until after Justice Stewart had left the Court.
Presumably, had he remained, the minority concurrence would have been a majority and af-
firmed the standard as set out in the earlier cases.
30. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 669 (1983).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 675-76.
33. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608 (1976).
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was too broad a standard to permit reasonable application."' To support this
proposition, he pointed out that the Oregon Court of Appeals had found
overreaching, but the trial court had not.1
Finding the overreaching standard inappropriate, Justice Rehnquist outlined
a standard that bars reprosecution only when a prosecutor evinces a specific
intent to provoke a motion for mistrial.36 He found the specific intent stan-
dard more susceptible to application because the intent of the prosecutor could
be inferred from "objective facts and circumstances.""'
Justice Powell's Concurrence
Justice Powell concurred in the majority opinion insofar as it was limited
to intent as controlling the issue of reprosecution.3 8 Presumably fearing that
the intent standard suggested by the majority opinion might be interpreted
as a test of pure subjective intent, he emphasized the portion of the opinion
that held intent could be inferred from objective facts and circumstances.
Justice Powell then concluded that the requisite intent was absent in Kennedy
and concurred in the result that reprosecution was not barred on the Kennedy
facts. 9
Justice Powell's concurring opinion is particularly important in that it
established the requisite majority needed to modify the previous standard of
overreaching. His concurrence is confusing, however, because his opinion in
Lee had adopted the overreaching standard, which included conduct motivated
by bad faith or designed to harass a defendant. This kind of conduct would
no longer bar reprosecution under the Kennedy standard; therefore, it is unclear
whether Justice Powell intended to completely abandon the position he had
taken in Lee.
Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Kennedy was joined by three other
Justices.4 0 He found it inconceivable that a defendant could prove "that a
prosecutor's conduct was motivated by an intent to provoke a mistrial in-
stead of an attempt simply to prejudice a defendant."14' He found more realistic
34. 456 U.S. 667, 674 (1982).
35. Id. at 675 n.5.
36. Id. at 679.
37. Id.
38. Justice Powell wrote the opinion in Lee.
39. 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982). Justice Powell mentions several factors which might indicate
intent on the part of the prosecutor. A sequence of acts which amount to overreaching could
imply intent to provoke a mistrial. A prosecutor's surprise at and resistance to a motion might
negate the intent. Finally, a prosecutor's testimony at a hearing on the motion should indicate
directly whether intent was present.
40. Id. at 681. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens' opinion.
Justice Brennan also wrote an opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, which acknowledged that
the Oregon court could conclude that the Oregon constitution might bar reprosecution where
the U.S. Constitution did not.
41. Id. at 688.
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the overreaching standard that focused on the nature of the prosecutor's con-
duct. Such a standard, denounced by Justice Rehnquist, could indeed be easily
applied. "It is sufficient that the court is persuaded that egregious prosecutorial
misconduct has rendered unmeaningful the defendant's choice to continue or
abort the proceedings.'' , 2 Justice Stevens concluded that the broader stan-
dard of overreaching should "remain available for the rare case in which it
may be needed."'
3
Views of the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause
It is quite possible that the discrepancy between the various approaches
taken in Kennedy is a result of each Justice's particular view as to the pur-
pose of the double jeopardy clause. The classic definition of the protection
afforded by the clause was announced in Green v. United States." In Green
the Court held that the double jeopardy clause prohibited multiple trials of
a defendant hat would have the effect of "subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anx-
iety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though in-
nocent he may be found guilty. ' ' 4" Thus Green delineated two purposes served
by the double jeopardy clause. One purpose is to protect the defendant from
suffering the indignity of multiple trials; the less protective purpose is to pre-
vent subsequent rials from reducing the possibility of acquittal. The specific
intent standard may adequately protect one of these purposes without ad-
dressing the other. A brief examination of the protections outlined in Green
will illustrate the adequacy, or lack thereof, of the Kennedy standard in fur-
thering the objectives of the double jeopardy clause.
Multiple trials make conviction more likely from the simple standpoint of
probability. The additional opportunities to convict make that result more
likely than if the state were limited to one attempt. But convictions at subse-
quent trials are more likely even if one ignores the laws of probability. There
is a distinction between extra opportunities to convict and more favorable
opportunities to convict. At each subsequent rial, the state's evidence becomes
stronger and stronger, thus enhancing the possibility of conviction.46 This threat
has been recognized as the most serious to the rights of the defendant by
the Supreme Court in Downum v. United States7: "Harassment of an ac-
cused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford
42. Id. at 689. Justice Stevens apparently, relied on the language in Dinitz, which is con-
cerned with the defendant's control over the course of the trial.
43. Id. at 691. Justice Stevens also noted that the overreaching standard had not worked
serious hardship on a prosecutor's chance to reprosecute, since very few reprosecutions had been
barred by it.
44. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
45. Id. at 187-88.
46. See Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In Carsey, it was noted
that subtle changes in the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses inevitably work to the detri-
ment of the defendant; essentially neutral testimony becomes incrimination at subsequent rials
(Levanthal, J., concurring).




the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict are examples when
jeopardy attaches. . ".."" If the primary purpose of the double jeopardy clause
is to prevent a prosecutor from "bootstrapping" a better chance at convic-
tion, the specific intent standard of Kennedy may provide the defendant with
adequate protection because the prosecutor would be prohibited from secur-
ing the "more favorable opportunity" by intentionally provoking a mistrial.9
While the Kennedy specific intent standard may be sufficient to protect
one purpose of the double jeopardy clause, it is totally inadequate to further
the purpose of assuring that a defendant will not suffer unwarranted multiple
trials. Under Kennedy, the defendant could be reprosecuted after any mistrial,
unless he could show that the prosecutor specifically intended to provoke the
defendant's motion for mistrial. The only alternative to reprosecution available
to the defendant would be to continue a proceeding tainted by the prejudice
or harassment of the prosecutor, prejudice no less severe merely because it
was not calculated to provoke a mistrial motion. As Justice Stewart pointed
out in Dinitz, such a choice for the defendant is meaningless.0 The over-
reaching standard of Jorn, Dinitz, and Lee addressed the issue of severity
of prejudice by focusing on the egregiousness of the prosecutor's conduct.
If his conduct so severely prejudices the defendant as to render this choice
meaningless, reprosecution is barred. The Kennedy specific intent standard
does not answer the question of meaningful choice because it ignores that
degree of conduct that falls short of a deliberate intention to provoke a mistrial
motion. Thus, although the specific intent standard may serve the less protec-
tive purpose of the double jeopardy clause, it completely ignores the other."'
The adoption of the Kennedy standard may indicate which of the purposes
outlined in Green is considered the more valuable by the majority in Ken-
nedy; it may also indicate that the majority finds. the ordeal of enduring multi-
ple trials and prosecutions inconsequential.
In both Divans and Kennedy, Justice Rehnquist indicated that he favored
the purpose of the double jeopardy clause that prevented a prosecutor from
intentionally obtaining a better opportunity to convict a defendant by pro-
voking a mistrial motion. The only passage from Dinitz that he cited with
approval in the Kennedy opinion was that containing the "opportunity to
convict" language.2 In both Divans and Kennedy, Justice Rehnquist cited
Downum, which mentions only the less protective double jeopardy protection.3
Clearly, Justice Rehnquist regards the right to be free from the ordeal of multi-
48. Id. at 736.
49. Even this proposition may be questionable. As Justice Stevens points out, the intent standard
would permit a prosecutor to try a case an inadmissible evidence and severely prejudicial remarks.
This in and of itself gives a more favorable opportunity to convict, and that opportunity is secured
by the fact that reprosecution would not be barred if a mistrial is granted at the request of
the defendant.
50. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 610 (1976).
51. Other courts have decided that an intent standard does not adequately protect the rights
of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Bolden, 478 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977).
52. 456 U.S. 667, 680 (1982).
53. Id., citing Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). See Divans v. California,
434 U.S. 1303, 1304 (1977).
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ple trials as secondary and finds a test based on intent to be a sufficient
safeguard for the defendant.
Criticisms of Kennedy
Several problems are evident in the Kennedy opinions. The threshold ques-
tion is whether the majority will uphold the Kennedy specific intent standard
in future cases before the Court. Justice Powell, whose concurrence completed
the majority, is already on record as supporting both the Kennedy standard
and the overreaching standard. In Lee he supports the overreaching standard,
focusing on a prosecutor's conduct from an objective view; in Kennedy he
seems to agree that the subjective intent of the prosecutor is the controlling
factor. Even in concurring, though, Justice Powell closely scrutinized the con-
duct of the prosecutor and finally concluded that no such intent could be
found. He noted that Kennedy could easily have been a close case factually
had any other indicia of intent been present."' His reluctance to summarily
dismiss the prosecutor's conduct as permitting reprosecution may indicate an
uneasiness with the Kennedy standard.
It appears that Justice Powell may prefer a standard that incorporates both
the objective conduct test and the subjective intent test. This was clearly his
position in Lee. He seems to have concurred in the Kennedy majority under
the assumption that the objective conduct that would result in overreaching
would be sufficient to establish an inference that the prosecutor harbored the
specific intent to provoke a motion for mistrial. It remains to be seen what
Justice Powell's position will be if the Court is confronted with conduct more
egregious than that in Kennedy. Since Justice Powell declined in Lee to ad-
dress the issue of whether a prosecutor's gross negligence might bar retrial
when a motion for mistrial is granted, that issue may still be open to future
consideration."
Assuming the majority in Kennedy does stand fast, the problem still re-
mains of determining a prosecutor's subjective intent at the time of such
conduct.5 6 This was the brunt of Justice Stevens' attack on the specific intent
standard. He found particularly repugnant any standard that would require
a prosecutor to testify as to his intent during the course of the trial." This
is a likely result of the Kennedy decision because other evidence of intent
may not be obvious from the prosecutor's conduct." This concern with the
Kennedy standard seems to be for the integrity of the proceedings. In such
circumstances a prosecutor might have two motives for hedging the truth.
54. 456 U.S. at 680.
55. In Lee, Justice Powell finds mere negligence as insufficient to bar reprosecution (432
U.S. 23, 34 (1977)), but has never considered grossly negligent conduct in either Lee or Kennedy.
56. Other courts have decided that specific intent of the prosecutor is just too hard to deter-
mine. See Commonvealth v. Bolden, 478 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977).
57. 456 U.S. 667, 688 n.25.
58. This issue is not addressed by Justice Rehnquist, but Justice Powell mentions it as a




First, he would wish to preserve an opportunity to retry the defendant. Second,
he would be placed in a compromising position if required to reveal his
thoughts just prior to committing an act of prosecutorial misconduct." If
he indicates that he did intend to provoke a mistrial motion by the defend-
ant, he obviously loses the chance to retry the defendant in the future. But
he also would have admitted a violation of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility."0 Moreover, a prosecutor would also violate the Code if he
succumbed to the pressure to preserve a retrial and lied about his intent to
prevent a double jeopardy bar." Thus, Justice Stevens' concern for the in-
tegrity of the proceedings is borne out by the prosecutor's dilemma; the
standard would encourage a prosecutor to misrepresent his intent, which would
be a serious breach of ethics.
Another criticism of the Kennedy specific intent standard is that it is inade-
quate to protect a defendant's rights. As has been seen earlier, the Kennedy
standard fails to serve both double jeopardy purposes adequately, thus com-
promising an accused's rights under the clause.62 The specific intent standard
also fails to guarantee the defendant a trial free from prejudice intentionally
injected by a prosecutor. As Justice Stevens pointed out, the prosecutor would
be permitted to use prejudicial tactics and inadmissible evidence, similar to
those problems posed in the opening examples, without forfeiting his chance
at a second prosecution, provided that his intent is to convict rather than
to provoke a mistrial motion.63 Although the conduct of the prosecutor might
conceivably be punished by contempt, this does not guarantee that the defend-
ant will not have to endure the prejudice at the trial. Only the possibility
of a bar to reprosecution, independent of the subjective intent of the pros-
ecutor, will ensure that the prosecutor does not engage in impermissible at-
tempts to convict. With this additional sanction for conduct not amounting
to intentional provocation, a prosecutor will consider his conduct more
thoroughly before acting in an irresponsible manner."
A final criticism of the Kennedy decision is that the majority went beyond
existing precedent and made new law where it was unnecessary. Justice Stevens
prefaced his opinion by recognizing this fact,65 and attacked the majority:
"Instead of explaining why that conclusion is required by settled law, the
Court gratuitously lops off a portion of the previously recognized exception."'6
Since all the Justices concurred in the result, it does seem evident that the
existing standard of overreaching under Jorn, Dinitz, and Lee was adequate
59. 456 U.S. at 688 n.25.
60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmnT DR 7-106 (C)(6) (1979). In such a case
the prosecutor would knowingly be violating an established rule of procedure or of evidence.
61. Id., DR 7-102 (A)(5). He would have knowingly made a false statement of fact.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
63. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 689 (1982).
64. Although punishment of prosecutorial misconduct is not an explicit goal of the double
jeopardy clause, this would satisfy one of the aims of the clause.
65. 456 U.S. 667, 689 (1982).
66. Id.
1983]
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to decide the case. The Oregon Court of Appeals simply failed to apply that
overreaching standard properly; it did not apply the wrong standard, as Justice
Rehnquist asserted.6
7
Justice Rehnquist defended this accusation by noting the confusion of lower
courts in adopting the overreaching standard and concluded that the majority
did not make new law. He asserted that the majority had merely chosen to
adopt one of the interpretations given the overreaching standard in Jorn and
Dinitz, and that the minority had done the same in adopting the other
interpretation." This argument seems tenuous, however, because Justice Rehn-
quist first announced this interpretation in Divans at a time when few courts
recognized the intent standard as a possible interpretation of Jorn and Dinitz.
Most lower courts did not focus singularly on the subjective intent of the
prosecutor until after Divans, and courts doing so cited Divans for that
proposition.9
The Effect of Kennedy on Lower Court Application of the Exception
Criticism notwithstanding, the decision in Kennedy will have the effect of
introducing uniformity of application to the double jeopardy bar to reprosecu-
tion. Justice Rehnquist was correct in pointing out the confusion experienced
by the lower courts when interpreting the overreaching standard set forth in
Jorn, Dinitz, and Lee." Certain courts of appeal in the federal branch have
taken the position that overreaching also includes bad faith conduct intended
to harass or prejudice the defendant, though not intended to provoke a mistrial
motion.' Others have gone farther and determined that the overreaching
standard includes gross negligence on the part of the prosecutor, and that
such conduct would bar reprosecution after a successful mistrial motion by
the defendant." However, some federal courts have confined the overreaching
67. This notion is reinforced by the fact that the Oregon court discussed intent in terms
of whether the question was intentional; but the issue in the overreaching standard is whether
the intent was to provoke a mistrial motion. See State v. Kennedy, 49 Or. App. 415, 619 P.2d
948 (1980).
68. 456 U.S. 667, 678 n.8 (1982).
69. See United States v. Leppo, 641 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Roberts,
640 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Green, 636 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1980).
Compare United States v. Martinez, 667 F.2d 886, 889 (10th Cir. 1981); State v. Iglesias, 374
So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting expansion beyond intentional conduct).
70. Numerous courts have cited Jorn and Dinitz for the overreaching standard. See United
States v. Westhoff, 653 F.2d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1981); Baker v. Metcalf, 633 F.2d 1198, 1201
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Klande, 602 F.2d 180, 182 (8th Cir. 1979). These particular
cases are interesting because they do not mention Divans, even though they were decided after
that memorandum opinion, indicating that Divans has little, if any, precedential value.
71. Wilkett v. United States, 655 F.2d 1007, 1011 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pollack,
640 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1981); United States 'v. Love, 597 F.2d 81, 86 (6th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976). Some courts have adopted the bad faith
conduct standard initially, but then reversed their positions, holding that only subjective intent
to provoke a mistrial motion would bar reprosecution. See United States v. Roberts, 640 F.2d
225, 228 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. United States v. Westhoff, 653 F.2d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Enoch,
650 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Zozlio, 617 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1980); United States
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standard to conduct intended to provoke a mistrial motion.73 At least one
has adopted a position that bad faith conduct was by definition that which
was intended to provoke a mistrial motion, and that intentional conduct that
only prejudices the defendant is not bad faith conduct and would not bar
reprosecution.74
Application of the overreaching standard laid down in Jorn, Dinitz, and
Lee has been similarly confusing at the state court level." The lower courts
in Oregon provide a convenient illustration of this confusion. The trial court
in Kennedy found no overreaching because the conduct of the prosecutor was
not intended to provoke a mistrial motion, and retrial was therefore
permissible.7 6 The Oregon Court of Appeals accepted the finding that the pros-
ecutor lacked this intent, but found the conduct to be overreaching:
We think the prosecutor is charged with the knowledge that the
comment-which we must regard as intentional, at least in the sense
that it appears it was made deliberately and after some thought-
was certain to interfere with the trial process. Defendant was then
faced with a Hobson's choice.
77
Both lower courts in Kennedy applied the same standard in determining
whether the double jeopardy clause barred reprosecution and reached dia-
metrically opposite results.
Conclusion
Uniformity in the application of the overreaching standard is a desirable
result and will no doubt be enhanced by the decision in Kennedy. What is
bothersome is that this result is reached by unnecessarily narrowing the
previously established standard of overreaching as a bar to reprosecution and
infringing on the rights of the defendant in the process. The Kennedy specific
intent standard is inadequate to protect a defendant against the harassment
of multiple trials, and is equally inadequate to prevent intentionally injected
prejudice on the part of the prosecutor. Even less desirable is the result that
the integrity of the trial process is threatened by a narrow rule that permits
v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074; United States v. Kennedy,
548 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1977), reh. denied, 554 F.2d 476, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 865.
73. United States v. Leppo, 641 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Roberts, 640
F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Green, 636 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Nelson, 582 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1978).
74. United States v. Gamble, 607 F.2d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1979).
75. The state courts are also in disagreement. Some use the bad faith conduct implicit in
the overreaching standard in Dinitz. People v. Peterson, 113 Mich. App. 537, 318 N.W.2d 233
(1982); State v. Mendoza, 101 Wis. 654, 305 N.W.2d 166 (1981). Others include gross negligence.
Commonwealth v. Watson, 274 Pa. Super. 233, 418 A.2d 382 (1980). But see Commonwealth
v. Palmer, 276 Pa. Super. 473, 419 A.2d 555 (1980). Still others confine the overreaching stan-
dard to intentional conduct. State v. Aillon, 182 Conn. 124, 438 A.2d 30 (1980); State v. Con-
nor, 383 So. 2d 389 (La. 1980); Lee v. State, 47 Md. App. 367, 423 A.2d 267 (1980); State
v. Soldier, 299 N.W.2d 568 (S.D. 1980).
76. 456 U.S. 667, 669 (1982).
77. State v. Kennedy, 49 Or. App. 415, 619 P.2d 948 (1980).
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